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ABSTRACT
Face anti-spoofing plays a vital role in security systems including face payment
systems and face recognition systems. Previous studies showed that live faces and
presentation attacks have significant differences in both remote
photoplethysmography (rPPG) and texture information. We propose a
generalized method exploiting both rPPG and texture features for face anti-
spoofing task. First, we design multi-scale long-term statistical spectral (MS-
LTSS) features with variant granularities for the representation of rPPG
information. Second, a contextual patch-based convolutional neural network
(CP-CNN) is used for extracting global-local and multi-level deep texture features
simultaneously. Finally, weight summation strategy is employed for decision level
fusion of the two types of features, which allow the proposed system to be
generalized for detecting not only print attack and replay attack, but also mask
attack. Comprehensive experiments were conducted on five databases, namely
3DMAD, HKBU-Mars V1, MSU-MFSD, CASIA-FASD, and OULU-NPU, to
show the superior results of the proposed method compared with state-of-the-art
methods.
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Kasvojen anti-spoofingilla on keskeinen rooli turvajärjestelmissä, mukaan
lukien kasvojen maksujärjestelmät ja kasvojentunnistusjärjestelmät. Aiemmat
tutkimukset osoittivat, että elävillä kasvoilla ja esityshyökkäyksillä on
merkittäviä eroja sekä etävalopölymografiassa (rPPG) että tekstuuri-
informaatiossa, ehdotamme yleistettyä menetelmää, jossa hyödynnetään sekä
rPPG: tä että tekstuuriominaisuuksia kasvojen anti-spoofing -tehtävässä.
Ensinnäkin rPPG-informaation esittämiseksi on suunniteltu monivaiheisia
pitkän aikavälin tilastollisia spektrisiä (MS-LTSS) ominaisuuksia, joissa on
muunneltavissa olevat granulariteetit. Toiseksi, kontekstuaalista patch-pohjaista
konvoluutioverkkoa (CP-CNN) käytetään globaalin paikallisen ja monitasoisen
syvään tekstuuriominaisuuksiin samanaikaisesti. Lopuksi,
painoarvostusstrategiaa käytetään päätöksentekotason fuusioon, joka auttaa
yleistämään menetelmää paitsi hyökkäys- ja toisto-iskuille, mutta myös peittää
hyökkäyksen. Kattavat kokeet suoritettiin viidellä tietokannalla, nimittäin
3DMAD, HKBU-Mars V1, MSU-MFSD, CASIA-FASD ja OULU-NPU,
ehdotetun menetelmän parempien tulosten osoittamiseksi verrattuna uusimpiin
menetelmiin.
Avainsanat: Kasvojen anti-spoofing, rPPG, naamio, kontekstuaalinen
korjaustiedostoon perustuva CNN
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1. INTRODUCTION
    Security systems have always been a significant research area. Biometric systems
are widely used in our daily lives.  Fingerprint, voiceprint, iris, and face are the most
commonly used biometric modalities. As one of the most popular modalities, the face
is widely used in designing artificial intelligence security systems, e.g., face
recognition systems [17] [18], access authorization systems, and payment
authorization systems. Several face-based security systems are shown in Figure 1. At
the same time, many presentation attacks have been developed for spoofing the face
security system. The presentation attacks can be divided into multiple types. Samples
of the three most common types of attack, e.g., print attack, video reply attack and
mask attack, are shown in Figure 3.
(1) Print attack: an attacker presents a printed photo or image of the legitimate user
to the face authentication system. However, the 2D structure lacks of the depth
information, pulse information, and life signs in face, such as blinking, head
movement, and facial expressions. Most of face authentication systems require
users to present facial expressions or head motions. So, the print attack is the
weakest attack among all kinds of attacks.
(2) Video replay attack: an attacker presents video sequences containing the
legitimate user’s face on displays. The video replay attack is more difficult than
print attack since video could contain the movements that the system requires
and the pulse information. However, the reflection of the screen makes the
texture of the input video wired, hence it can be discriminated easily.
(3) Mask attack: an attacker wears a 3D face mask to cheat the system. Mask attack
is the most difficult attack to be detected because the high-quality mask is quite
similar to the real face. It also contains the depth information which is widely
used in face anti-spoofing. However, it is pricey to get realistic masks and mask
lacks of pulse information.
Figure 1. Examples of systems of face-based security. (a) Access authorization
system; (b) Payment authorization system; (c) Face unlock system on mobile phone.
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During the past decade, many researchers have made efforts for face anti-spoofing
area [20]-[29]. Most of the researches were based on 2D sensors. However, the
limitation of 2D sensors is that a single 2D sensor cannot record 3D structure
information. The 3D structure information is widely utilized in face anti-spoofing.
With the help of 3D structure information, most of the face presentation attacks can be
handled easily. An example is the iPhone X face unlock technique; it uses the dot
projector to project more than 30,000 invisible dots onto the user's face to build the 3D
facial map. Most recent research works also focus on estimating the depth map from a
2D image [13][14][30]. Even though the 3D structure information contributes to face
anti-spoofing, the disadvantage is also obvious. When high-quality mask attack
presents, the 3D structure information could be the same as genuine faces, which
makes the system based on sole depth information vulnerable.
To resolve this security problem in face anti-spoofing, we proposed a model that
employs both remote photoplethysmography (rPPG) feature and texture feature. As
Figure 3. Our model uses the rPPG feature and the texture feature.
Figure 2. There common types of face attacks. (a) Print attack; (b) Video replay
attack; (c) Mask attack.
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shown in Figure 2, rPPG feature is effective for photo attack and mask attack, while
texture feature is effective for detecting video replay attacks.
When light shines on the skin of the body, for example, face, hands, and arms,
hemoglobins in superficial vessels absorb part of the lights, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Heartbeats periodically change the number of hemoglobins in specific areas. The rPPG
can capture the subtle colour changes so that to estimate the pulse. Prior studies have
reported several methods to estimate rPPG signal from facial videos recorded by RGB
cameras [31][32][33].
    Inspired by the pulse-based face anti-spoofing method [34], we explore pulse signal
features extracted by the rPPG algorithm. Our pulse signal feature extraction method
is inspired by a prior work, where the long-term statistical spectral (LTSS) [7] feature
is first used for face anti-spoofing research. The original LTSS was utilized in speaker
presentation attack detection. We propose to use the Multi-scale LTSS (MS-LTSS)
features in our study. This method combines different length of sliding windows and
different overlapping sizes of the sliding window of LTSS features to represent both
local and global features of frequency spectrum of the rPPG signal respectively to
improve classification results.
    The Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) showed its excellent performance in
anti-spoofing tasks. In order to strengthen our anti-spoofing model, we propose a
Contextual Patch-based CNN (CP-CNN) to analyse the texture features. The proposed
CNN model extracts the local and global features from face images, where the local
features are extracted from fixed patches of the deep feature image, and the global
features are extracted from the whole deep feature image. The face anti-spoofing
databases contain various video qualities. Hence, the combination of local and global
features assists the model to learn independent patterns with the integral patterns of
spatial face areas. “Contextual” means that the connection of outputs from
Convolutional blocks, which allows the network to utilize different texture features
extracted from multiple layers. Contributions of the thesis include: 1) we design multi-
Figure 4. Illustration of how an rPPG works.
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scale long-term statistical spectral (MS-LTSS) features with various granularities for
representation of rPPG information; 2) we propose a contextual patch-based
convolutional neural network (CP-CNN), which is able to extract global-local and
multi-level texture features simultaneously; 3) we fuse these two parts of information
in decision level, which allows the method to be able to detect all three common attack
types, i.e., photo attack, replay attack and mask attack.
    The structure of this thesis is organized as follows: in chapter 2 review face anti-
spoofing methods including pulse-based approaches and other approaches. Next, in
chapter 3 we describe details of the proposed methods for face anti-spoofing, including
the Multi-scale LTSS with the contextual Patch-based CNN. Then in chapter 4, we
illustrate the process of our experiments, the setups, and the comparison of the
experimental results on five anti-spoofing databases, namely 3DMAD, HKBU-Mars
V1, MSU-MFSD, CASIA-FASD, and OULU-NPU. Discussion of the experimental
results are also reported in this chapter. Finally, in chapter 5 we summarize the thesis
work and list future work.
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2. PRIOR WORKS
Most important previous studies about the face anti-spoofing problem are reviewed
and summarized in this section, as the background for the thesis work. Based on the
key clue information that these methods reply on, we divide previous face anti-
spoofing methods into five groups: texture-based methods, temporal-based methods,
3D structure-based methods, hardware-based methods, and remote
photoplethysmography-based methods, each will be discussed in details in the
following subsections.
2.1. Texture-based methods for face anti-spoofing
     Using texture information to deal with the face anti-spoofing task is one major and
common approach, because most face recognition systems use one single 2D sensor
camera. Many research works proposed various hand-crafted features for this purpose,
such as Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [35][36][37], Histogram of Gradient (HoG)
[38][39], Difference of Gaussian (DoG) [42][43], Scale-invariant Feature Transform
(SIFT) [40] and Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF) [41]. Traditional classifiers such
as support vector machine (SVM), Random Forest, and Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) were utilized in those works. In [34], they utilized the LBP-ms-color features
as a part of their proposed cascaded model. Where ms indicates that multi-scale LBP
features combining with the LBP8,1, LBP8,2, LBP8,3, LBP8,4 and LBP16,2 features. And
color indicates that the LBP features extracted from RGB channels of the face image
separately. In [35], they proposed to use the LBP-TOP (local binary patterns from three
orthogonal planes) features which analyses three-dimensional texture features to
discriminate a face video as live vs. spoof.  Prior works also tried to transform input
data into different domains, e.g., to transform input images from RGB colour space
into HSV or YCbCr colour spaces [44][45], or from time domain to frequency domain,
to obtain more robust results. However, these texture-based methods share some
common limitations, because the extracted features can be affected by various
conditions, such as camera qualities, illumination conditions, and presentation attack
instruments.
    In recent years, deep learning methods showed their power in many research areas,
especially in computer vision tasks. Several works used CNN-based features for face
anti-spoofing [47][48][49][50]. Li et al. [48] used CNN as the feature extractor and
fine-tuned a model which is pretrained on ImageNet for face anti-spoofing. Feng et al.
[47] fed the samples of face images into CNN and obtained the result of classification,
i.e., live vs. spoof. Atoum et al. [13] proposed to use patch-based CNN as a part of
their two-stream CNN model, which segments the input face image into small patches
to analyze the texture features for face liveness detection. This method solved the
problem of insufficient training samples for neural network models. In more recent
research works, deep learning methods achieved superior performance on anti-
spoofing databases and in anti-spoofing competitions. For some old databases, such as
NUAA [52], and Replay-Attack [53], which were collected several years ago, video
resolution and quality are very poor. Deep learning methods can achieve 100%
accuracy, which is more robust than traditional texture methods. On the other side,
newer databases such as OULU-NPU [4] and SiW [14] include higher-quality videos
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recorded from a large number of subjects in different conditions, which might be more
challenging. New deep learning methods need to be developed on those databases.
Compared to other computer vision tasks, e.g., object detection, object
identification, and facial expression classification, the task of face anti-spoofing using
deep learning methods still have a long way to run. One goal of this thesis is to
construct a novel CNN model, which is able to extract more reliable texture features
for face liveness detection.
2.2. Temporal-based methods for face anti-spoofing
Temporal-based methods can be further divided into two categories. The first
category of methods is based on facial motion patterns, such as eye-blinking and mouth
or lip movements. Prior works reported that the frequency of spontaneous blinking of
normal people is about 0.25 to 0.5 blinks per second. Hence, Sun et al. [54] proposed
a blinking-based face anti-spoofing method, which utilized Conditional Random
Fields (CRFs) to analyze eye blinking actions (eye closed and opening state). The main
idea of the proposed CRFs method is to represent actions by face images. In addition,
Sun compared the performance of CRFs with Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) and
Hidden Markov Model (HMM), and CRFs achieved outstanding results. Pan et al. [55]
reported a method which combines eyeblinks and scene context for face recognition
to imitate the contextual relationships of eyeblinks among eye image sequences by
using undirected conditional graphical structure. Phan et al. [74] proposed to utilize
the Local Derivative Pattern from Three Orthogonal Planes (LDP-TOP) [73] features
to describe motions of the facial. Tirunagari et al. [75] proposed to utilize the dynamic
mode decomposition (DMD) to describe the feature of movements. Li et al. [76]
proposed to utilize the Difference of Gaussian filter to analyze the variation of motion
patterns which are aroused by different dimensions of objects.
The other category of methods relied on the movement between the face and the
background. Anjos et al. [77] considered to measure the motion correlation coefficient
of the face and the background, and set a threshold to classify the print attack or real
access. Kollreider et al. [56] proposed to use optical flow methods to track the
movement of face to differentiate real vs. fake faces. Besides, Haralick features [70]
and motion mag [69] were also used in face anti-spoofing. For deep learning, Feng et
al. [47] proposed to extract features from optical flow map and Shearlet image using
CNN. Xu et al. [51] also proposed the LSTM-CNN model using multiple frames of
the single video to obtain the fused result of classification.
However, the motion clues that these temporal based methods rely on can be easily
manipulated. For example, an attacker can hold a print face photo with cropped eye
holes (e.g., cropped print attack in CASIA). On the other side, there are other forms of
temporal clues for face liveness, which are much harder (or impossible) to fake, that
is the temporal colour fluctuation of live facial skin caused by pulsation (a.k.a. the
rPPG) invisible to human eyes. Thus, another goal of the thesis work is to extract and
utilize the rPPG information for face liveness detection.
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2.3. 3D structure-based methods for face anti-spoofing
Most of existing anti-spoofing databases have 2D videos, which do not contain 3D
structure information. A popular method of 3D structure-based face anti-spoofing
methods is to extract depth information from 2D images. Liu et al. [14] proposed a
CNN model which uses the depth map with auxiliary supervision instead of binary
supervision. They estimated the 3D structure of the face by implementing the most
recent dense face alignment (DeFA) methods [57][58]. Then they trained a CNN
model to extract the depth map and the feature map together to classify the input video.
In [13], the authors proposed a depth-based CNN model as a part of their two-stream
CNN model. They utilized the same 3D face model fitting algorithm as in Liu’s work
to estimate the shape parameters and projection matrix. Then they utilized the 3DMM
model [71] for computing the dense 3D face shape. Then they extracted the feature
from the estimated depth mask and utilized the SVM to classify the input video as live
vs. spoof.
However, methods mentioned in this session may become vulnerable when an
attacker wears a high-quality 3D mask. Because the mask has the same 3D structure
information as the genuine face, and it can easily cheat these 3D structure-based
methods.
2.4. Hardware-based methods for face anti-spoofing
With the help of various advanced hardware, such as depth cameras, light-field
cameras and infrared cameras, we can analyse additional information to detect face
attacks. IPhone X can analyse the 3D shape information recorded by a dot projector
which could project more than 30,000 invisible dots onto an user’s face to build the
3D facial map. Then the 3D model of the input sample is compared with that of a
genuine face to obtain the result of live vs. spoof. Erdogmus et al. [78] proposed to
record depth information using a Kinect camera, then compared the depth information
to classify the video as live vs. spoof. Pavlidis et al. [79] considered the variation of
light reflection, and they proposed to calculate the upper-band of near-infrared (NIR)
spectrum recorded by a multi-spectral camera. Furthermore, Zhang et al. [80] utilized
two photodiodes to capture the light reflectance, and used this feature to detect the
presentation attack.
The light-field camera is becoming more and more popular recently. It can record
the disparity information with the depth information from a single capture. Kim et al.
[81], Ji et al. [83], and Moghaddam et al. [82] utilized this kind of cameras to tackle
the face presentation attack detection task.
Although these methods introduced above achieved good performance on video
replay attack and print attack, they could be influenced by the variations in a realistic
environment. For instance, the illumination condition could cause serious interferences
for infrared cameras and depth cameras. As well these methods could be vulnerable
when an attacker wears a high-quality 3D mask, since the 3D mask contains the same
depth information as the real face. Furthermore, the hardware-based method requires
special devices which might be costly and not commonly accessible.
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2.5. Remote Photoplethysmography-based methods for face anti-spoofing
Remote Photoplethysmography (rPPG) is a method to extract pulse signal from
facial videos without any skin contact [32][59][60][61][62]. The analysis of extracted
rPPG signal can be used for face anti-spoofing. In the first part of this session, we
review three benchmark algorithms for extracting pulse signals from face videos. In
the later part of this session, we review several rPPG-based methods for face anti-
spoofing.
The first method named as Li CVPR was proposed in [31], the second method
named as CHROM was introduced in [32], and the third method named as Spatial
Subspace Rotation (SSR) was proposed in [66]. All three methods made a great impact
in the field of remote pulse signal measurement from facial videos and inspired later
studies on this topic. Sample figures of extracted pulse signals from the same facial
video using these three rPPG algorithms are shown in Figure 5, and the details of each
method are introduced below.
Li CVPR. In [31], Li et al. proposed a practical rPPG algorithm which can measure
pulse signal from facial videos recorded under realistic human-computer interaction
scenes. A simple version of this approach was first implemented in [34] for face
liveness detections. First, they used the Discriminative Response Map Fitting (DRMF)
approach to detect facial landmarks and determine the face region of interest (ROI) in
the first frame of the input video. Then they utilized the Kanade-Lucas-Tomasi (KLT)
method to track the region of interest (ROI) in the following image sequences. They
calculated the mean value of the green channel of the ROI for extracting the raw pulse
signal.
Considering illumination variation, they utilized the Distance Regularized Level Set
Evolution (DRLSE) algorithm to segment the background and regarded the mean of
the background region green channel as a reference to correct the raw pulse signal.
Figure 5. Examples of pulse signals extracted from a real face video by using different
rPPG algorithms.
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After that, Non-rigid Motion Elimination was implemented by segmenting the pulse
signal into clips and getting rid of the clips containing the non-rigid movements.
Finally, three filters were implemented to obtain the final signal, including (1) a
detrending filter to make the trend of the signal flattened; (2) a Moving-average filter,
to reduce the noise and smooth the signal; and (3) a bandpass filter with Hamming
window, to cut the signal frequency into [0.7, 4] Hz which covers the ordinary heart
rate range from 42 to 240 beat-per-minute (bpm).
CHROM. In [32], Hann et al. proposed the CHROM algorithm which is powerful but
comparatively simple. The first step of this algorithm is to find the skin region of the
input image by analysing the skin colour and compute the average colour of that
region. Then, the authors projected the value of the average skin colour onto a specific
colour space in order to capture the subtle changes of the skin colour caused by
heartbeats. Finally, a 5-point averaging filter used for reducing the random noise and
smoothing the signal, and a band-pass filter used for cutting the signal frequency into
[0.7, 4] Hz which covers the heart rate between 42 and 240, were implemented to
obtain the final pulse signal. This is a common algorithm that is widely used in tracking
rPPG signals. This algorithm shares some similarity to the method proposed in Li et
al. [34]. One key contribution of CHROM is that, it used the whole skin region instead
of the specific face region of interest, which might work better as more facial pixels
were analysed. However, in the step of skin region detection, the threshold of the skin
colour is hard to determine due to the different races, e.g. Caucasian, Asian or African,
and the illumination condition can also make impact on the recorded skin colours.
Spatial Subspace Rotation. Wang et al. [66] proposed the spatial subspace rotation
(SSR) method to extract rPPG signal from videos. Considering the RGB spatial
distribution of skin region pixels, the authors proposed to utilize spatial RGB
correlation. Rotation and scaling were implemented simultaneously when modelling
the two subspaces. They proposed to use the eigenvectors for computing the skin
colour region correlation matrix. The direction change of the eigenvectors and energy
changes of the eigenvalues were analysed in temporal domain. This method is able to
retrieve the pulse signal directly without filtering progress.
These previous rPPG algorithms focused on improving the accuracy of averaged
heart rate. On the one side, they are complex to be implemented because many
preprocess steps are required for input face sequences, such as ROI selection and skin-
pixels detection; on the other side, they also involved signal processing steps aimingfor
improving HR accuracy which is not necessary for the purpose of face liveness
detection. There is a novel deep learning rPPG algorithm proposed in our research
group, the PhysNet [8], which is an end-to-end system using spatio-temporal
convolutional neural network to extract rPPG signals from raw facial videos. We
consider the PhysNet to be a good tool for exploring rPPG-based features for the face
anti-spoofing problem and it will be explored in this thesis work.
For the task of face liveness detection, the main target is not computing the actual
reading of the heart rate, but differentiating whether there is reasonable pulsation or
not in order to justify whether it is a live or spoof face. So, we need to design and
propose features for face liveness detection based on these works.
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Several studies have explored rPPG-based methods for the face anti-spoofing
problem. Li et al. [34] proposed the first pulse-based face anti-spoofing method. They
extracted three pulse signals one from each of RGB channel, then utilized several
filters to process the raw pulse signals. The filtered pulse signals are transformed from
time domain to frequency domain and the maximum values of the power in frequency
range of [0.7, 4] Hz, and the ratio of max power with the total power from each RGB
signals are calculated. Finally, they got a simple six-dimensional feature, and utilized
the SVM classifier to discriminate the input video as live vs. spoof.
In order to achieve stronger representation ability, Heusch et al. [7] designed the
long-term statistical spectral (LTSS) approach for face liveness detection. The original
LTSS approach was designed for speaker presentation attack detection [11]. This
approach utilized the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to transform the pulse signal
from time domain into frequency domain and considered the log-magnitude of the
frequency bins of the spectrum for statistics. Then they used the mean and variance
statistics of the DFT coefficient as the feature of the pulse signal and classified by
SVM to discriminate the input video as live vs. spoof.
Liu et al. [63] proposed to use rPPG signals to discriminate 3D mask attack. Pulse
signals can be extracted from live faces, while there is only random noise if we try the
same way of extraction from 3D masks. They calculated the correlation features to
classify the face video as live vs. spoof, and achieved supportive results on 3DMAD
and HKBU-MARs V1 database. However, the cross-correlation can increase periodic
global noises, and frequencies of different facial regions are similar to each other.  In
another related work, Nowara et al. [64] overcame this problem by analysing five
different rPPG signals extracted from three face regions and two background regions
to classify print and video attacks.  Even though in video attacks, pulse signals still
exist, the analysis of specific regions can discriminate live vs. spoof.
In deep learning area, Liu et al. [14] proposed to use rPPG supervision instead of
analysing rPPG signal directly. They utilized rPPG signal to supervise their CNN-
RNN model, and trained the rPPG model by using the estimated rPPG signal as the
label of live face video, and flattened signal as the label of all kinds of attack videos.
Then they utilized the RNN model to classify the input video as live vs. spoof.
All the works mentioned above show the effectiveness of rPPG-based methods for
face liveness detection. However, rPPG based methods are vulnerable for video replay
attack, since the re-captured video could record the pulse signal from the original face
as well. Hence, we may need multiple methods to work together in order to detect
various types of attacks. In this work, we propose an innovative multi-temporal-
resolution rPPG feature as one part of the whole model for solving the face
presentation detection task.
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3. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
    In this section, firstly, we will introduce an innovative approach, the PhysNet to
extract rPPG signals from input facial videos. Secondly, we will present the proposed
Multi-scale long-term spectral statistics method for rPPG feature representation, which
improves the original LTSS [7] method on multi-scale level. Thirdly, we will describe
the Contextual Patch-based CNN as texture-based feature analysis for face anti-
spoofing. Finally, we will introduce our fusion method to merge the contribution of
the two features on the decision level. The overview of the proposed method is shown
in Figure 6.
3.1. rPPG-based Features for Anti-spoofing
    The approach takes videos as inputs. For a video with n frames, we use PhysNet
to extract rPPG signals. Then we utilize Multi-scale LTSS (MS-LTSS) to extract
features and feed the features to SVM as a classifier for the face liveness detection
task. The framework of the proposed rPPG-based method is shown in Figure 7.
3.1.1. Face cropping
    We utilize the Dlib [9] ‘68 facial landmark’ detector to locate the coordinates of the
nose and chin of face in each frame in a video. Then we use those coordinates to
estimate the bounding box of facial frames by the following equations and use
OpenCV to crop all the frame to 128×128 pixels. Figure 8 illustrates the facial
landmarks we use and how the image is cropped. We set the nose be the centre of the
cropped face and utilize the nose and chin coordinates to determine the bounding box
of the face region by following equations:
Figure 6. The overview of the proposed method.
Figure 7. The framework of the rPPG-based method.
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= − 4 ×
−
3 =
7 − 4
3 ,
(1)
= − 4 ×
−
3 .
(2)
Where, ( , ) and ( , ) is the coordinates of the nose and chin respectively.
(x, y) is the top left coordinates for the cropped image.
3.1.2. PhysNet
PhysNet is an innovative method to extract rPPG signal from raw face sequences
directly by using deep spatio-temporal convolutional networks. This is an end-to-end
model with no additional filter requires, which is very convenient. Hence, we utilize
this approach in this thesis. The architecture of PhysNet is shown in Figure 9.
The input of the network is T-frame face images. After forwarding several
operations of spatial and temporal convolution with average pooling, multi-channel
manifolds are formed to represent the spatio-temporal features. Finally, the latent
manifolds are projected into signal space using simple pseudo 3D convolution
operation with 1 × 1 × 1 kernel to generate the predicted rPPG signal.
We separate the cropped facial images into RGB channels, and feed the green
channel images into PhysNet pretrained on OBF [10] database to extract rPPG signals.
Figure 8. Example of using facial landmarks of nose and chin to crop the facial image.
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3.1.3. Multi-scale LTSS
  It is not suitable to directly use the extracted rPPG signal as the feature vector for
face liveness detection because it is time defined and can be high dimensional. Thus,
we need to design proper features for the task and here we utilize Multi-scale LTSS
for this purpose. Compared to the original LTSS extracting the spectral features only
on constant temporal dimension, the Multi-scale LTSS (MS-LTSS) combines the
spectral statistics of sliding windows with different length and different overlapping
size. As a result, we expect our proposed MS-LTSS can extract more elaborated rPPG
information due to the pyramid-like multi-scale segmentation.
    For each sliding window w, we convert the rPPG signal from time domain into
frequency domain by using an N-point discrete Fourier transform (DFT). Then we
receive a sequence of dimension = 0 … 2⁄ − 1 which contains DFT
coefficients. We consider log-magnitude of the frequency bins of the spectrum for
statistics. As in the original LTSS [11] used in speaker presentation attack detection,
we set the DFT coefficient | ( )| to 1 if it is lower than 1, so that the log-magnitude
is always positive. The mean and variance statistics of the coefficient vectors
( , , … , ) are computed as following:
( ) =
1
| ( )| . (3)
( ) =
1
| ( ) − ( )| . (4)
    The first and second order statistics for vectors (for = 0 … 2⁄ − 1 ) is
concatenated as the part of the feature of the signal. Then we introduced the Multi-
Figure 9. The architecture of PhysNet. The four-dimensional tensors showed under
each block are the corresponding output dimensions (channel × depth × height ×
width).
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scale LTSS, we concatenated the different LTSS features that calculated by different
settings of the length of sliding windows w and the overlapping size of the sliding
window o.
= [ , , … , , ], (5)
where, the F is the final MS-LTSS feature of the given signal, ,  is calculated by
, . Similarly, ,  is calculated by , . Then we used the SVM to acquire
the score of the input video, whether it is a genuine presentation or an attack.
3.2. Contextual Patch-based CNN for Anti-spoofing
Previous patch-based CNN methods [13] divide the original RGB face image into
several patches by randomly cropping the original face image and extracting the local
texture feature from the patches directly, which ignores the mutual information
interaction between global and local features. In order to better represent both global
and local texture features, a Contextual Patch-based CNN (CP-CNN) is proposed and
its architecture is shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10. The pipeline of the proposed CP-CNN architecture. The number of filters
are shown in the middle of each layer. Colour code used: purple=Patch convolution
layer, blue=convolution layer, green=pooling layer, orange=fully connect layer.
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3.2.1. Network Architecture of CP-CNN
As illustrated in Figure 10, the network backbone contains one convolution layer
with a 5x5 kernel and three ConvBlocks, which intends to obtain global texture
features. The ConvBlock consists of three convolutional layers with 3x3 kernel and
one maximum pooling layer. Every convolutional layer is followed by a batch
normalization layer and ReLU layer.
Patch-based Convolution Module. The key component in CP-CNN is the patch-
based convolution module, which extracted semantic patch feature in deep feature
Figure 11. Illustration of Patch-based Convolution Module when the local patch
number N = 4.
Figure 12. Illustration of different numbers of patches.
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level instead of RGB level. As shown in Figure 11, the deep features are divided into
N patches, then each patch features are convoluted with an independent 3x3 filter. It is
mentioned that the parameters of the 3x3 filter for each patch are not shared, which
helps to learn the discriminant features for each local patch position. There are two
patch-based convolution modules with convolutional two stride and four stride
embedded after the first and second ConvBlock respectively, which outputs the patch
features with the same spatial dimension for further fusion. In our experiment, the local
patch number is set as N = 4, 9, and 16 . The illustration of different numbers of
patches is shown in Figure 12.
Contextual Fusion. After obtaining the patch features and global feature, fusion is
needed for feature integration. The patch features are merged in spatial dimension and
reshape to the same spatial size as the global feature. Then all the global and patch
features are channel-wise concatenated, which is illustrated in Figure 11.  Hence, the
fused multi-level features are with rich contextual global-local information and strong
representation ability.
Global and Local Classifier. With the deep contextual features, a global classifier
and N local classifiers are designed for real face confidence prediction. As for the
global classifier, global average pooling is used and then cascaded with two fully
connected layers and a sigmoid function. Similarly, the local classifiers use the same
operations on the corresponding patch positions.
3.2.2. Loss Function and Network Inference
    In this work, we utilize Focal loss as our based loss function for the CNN model,
which was proposed by Lin et al. [16]. This loss function was designed for dense object
detection to solve the problem of class imbalance. The class imbalance could lead to
two consequences. (1) Training could be inefficient because most negative samples
are easily classified and not effectively contribute to model learning. (2) The easy
negative samples are overwhelmed during training and make the model degenerated.
Authors proposed to reduce the weight of easy negative samples, then lead the model
to focus more on the difficult samples. The face liveness detection databases are class
imbalanced as well. Hence, we utilize Focal loss in this thesis.
This loss function is modified based on cross entropy (CE) loss for binary
classification as follow:
( , ) = − log
( ) = 1
− log(1− ) ℎ .
(6)
In equation (7),  ∈  {±1}  represents the ground-truth class and ∈ [0, 1]  is the
estimated probability for the class by the model with label equals to 1. They defined
 instead of  for the national convenience,
= = 11 − ℎ . (7)
And they rewrote ( , ) = ( ) = −log ( ).
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    Here, they designed a weighting factor ∈ [0, 1] for class 1 and 1 −  for class 0.
For notational convenience, they defined  for , and rewrote the -balanced CE
loss as follow:
( ) = − log( ) . (8)
    As the equation above,  controls the balance of positive and negative samples, but
cannot discriminate the easy and hard samples. In other to allow the model to focus on
hard samples by reducing the weight of easy samples. They introduced a modulating
factor (1 − )  to the cross entropy loss with the tunable focusing parameterγ ≥  0,
and the focal loss is written as:
( ) = −(1− ) log( ) . (9)
    Finally, the focal loss which combines the weighting factor  and the modulating
factor is written as:
( ) = − (1 − ) log( ) . (10)
In the training stage, it can be regarded as a binary classification task. The network
input is an RGB face image × × , the output is the predicted global score and
patch based local scores ( = 1 … ) and N is the number of patches. If the face
image is a genuine face, we set the binary label as 1, while the label is set to 0 for
attacks. We adopt Focal loss as the loss function, so the overall loss can be formulated
as
= +
(1 − )∑
, (11)
where, w is a hyper-parameter to tradeoff the global loss  and all the patches losses
( = 1 … ).
In the inference stage, we use the weighted scores among all the global score  and
local scores  with the same hyper-parameter w. It can be formulated as
= +
(1− )∑
. (12)
Then we can obtain the fused score ∈ [0, 1] from one single frame. The final
result of the input video is the average predicted score across all video frames, as
=
∑
, (13)
where,  is the number of input video frames. ∈ [0, 1] is the final result of the
input video.
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3.3. Multi-modality Fusion
In order to fuse these two modalities features, i.e., rPPG features and texture features,
we employ the weight summation strategy in the decision level to fusion the scores
output from the Multi-scale LTSS model and Contextual Patch-based CNN model. So,
the fusion method can be formulated as
= + 1 − , (14)
where,  is the tradeoff weight,   is the predicted score of MS-LTSS and
 is the predicted score from CP-CNN.
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4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1. Experimental Setup
    We evaluate our method on five databases, 3DMAD [1], HKBU-Mars V1 [63],
MSU-MFSD [2], CASIA-FASD [3], and OULU-NPU [4], to demonstrate its
generalizability under three different types of attacks, e.g., print, video replay, and 3D
mask attacks. We perform intra testing among all five databases and cross testing
between 3DMAD and HKBU-Mars V1, and compare our results with several state-of-
the-art methods.
4.1.1. Databases
3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD): It contains 255 video clips recorded from 17
subjects. It has 170 real accesses and 85 3D mask attack videos. Each subject recorded
10 real videos, and 5 attack videos while wearing a 3D mask. All masks recorded in
the 3DMAD database were bought from ThatsMyFace.com. The frame rate of videos
is 30 frame per second (fps) and the resolution is 640×480. The length of each video
is 10 seconds. Two samples of 3DMAD video clips are shown in Figure 13.
HKBU 3D Mask Attack with Real World Variations V1 Database (HKBU-MARs
V1): This database contains 120 videos recorded from eight subjects. It has 80 real
access videos and 40 mask attack videos.  Mask attack videos are recorded with two
different kinds of 3D masks, of which six masks were bought from the
ThatsMyFace.com with the same quality as those in 3DMAD, and the rest two masks
with higher quality were bought from REAL-F 1 . All videos were captured by a
Logitech C920 web camera. The frame rate of each video is 30 fps and the resolution
is 1280×720. The length of each video is 10 seconds. Four samples of HKBU-Mars
V1 video clips are shown in Figure 14.
1 Detail for REAL-F: http://real-f.jp.
Figure 13. Examples of 3DMAD video clips. The left image shows a real face, and the
right one shows a mask attack.
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The MSU Mobile Face Spoofing Database (MSU-MFSD): This database contains
280 video clips recorded from 35 subjects, including print attack and video replay
attack. It has 70 real accesses and 210 attack videos. Each subject recorded two
genuine videos, four print attack videos, and two replay attack videos. Each type of
videos was recorded by two different kinds of cameras, MacBook Air 13’’ built-in
camera and Google Nexus 5 Android Phone. For the replay videos, they used two
methods. The one used Canon 550D for recording and iPad Air presenting. The other
one used iPhone 5S for both recording and presenting. The frame rate of videos is 30
Figure 14. Examples of HKBU-Mars V1 video clips. The top two images present the
real face and the mask bought from ThatsMyFace.com and the bottom two images
show the real face and the mask bought from real-f.jp.
Figure 15. Examples of MSU-MFSD videos. The first row presents images recorded
from an Android Phone, while the second row shows images recorded with a Laptop.
From left to right: real faces, replay video attack presented by iPad, replay video attack
presented by iPhone, and print attack.
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fps and the resolution is 640×480 and 720×480. The length of each video is 10 seconds.
Samples of MSU-MFSD video clips are shown in Figure 15.
The CASIA Face Anti-spoofing Database (CASIA-FASD): It contains 600 video
clips recorded from 50 subjects, including warped photo attack, cut photo attack, and
video replay attack. It has 150 real accesses and 450 attack videos. Each subject
recorded three genuine videos, three print videos, three warped videos, and three
replay attack videos. This database has high-quality, normal-quality, and low-quality
videos, and the resolution is 1280×720, 480×640, 640×480 respectively. The low-
quality videos were recorded using a USB webcam which is used for a long time and
degrade the video quality automatically. The normal-quality videos were recorded by
a new USB webcam which could keep the normal video quality. For high-quality
videos, they used a Sony NEX-5 camera which has the Full HD resolution. The replay
videos were all displayed using an iPad. The frame rate of videos is 25 fps and the
length of each video is approximately 5 seconds. Sample images of CASIA-FASD
video clips are shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16. Complete videos of one subject in CASIA-FASD. Top four images show
the low-quality videos, mid four are the normal-quality videos, and the bottom are the
high-quality videos. For the columns, from left to right: genuine, warped photo attack,
cut photo attack and video attack.
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OULU-NPU: It contains 4950 video clips recorded from 55 subjects, including print
attack and video replay attack. It has 1980 genuine videos and 3960 attack videos.
Each subject recorded 18 genuine videos, 36 print attack videos, and 36 replay attack
videos. Each type of video was recorded under three different illumination conditions
and by 6 different smartphones namely Samsung Galaxy S6 edge, HTC Desire EYE,
MEIZU X5, ASUS Zenfone Selfie, Sony XPERIA C5 Ultra Dual, and OPPO N3. For
print attacks, they utilized two different printers, Canon PIXMA iX6550, and Canon
imagePRESS C6011. The frame rate of videos is 30 fps and the resolution is
1080×1920. The length of each video is 5 seconds. This database provides four
protocols for testing. Protocol I is designed to evaluate the performance of methods
under unseen environmental conditions, specifically illumination and background
scene. Protocol II is designed to evaluate the generalization of the methods under
Figure 17. The examples of OULU-NPU videos. The first row presents video clips
taken from the first scenario, the second row shows video clips from the second
scenario, and the third row presents video clips from the third scenario. From left
column to right column: real faces and printed photos 1, printed photos 2, replay videos
1 and replay video 2.
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different types of printers or displays. Protocol III is a Leave One Camera Out (LOCO)
protocol to evaluate the performance of sensor interoperability. Protocol IV is the most
challenging protocol, it contains all above three conditions together to evaluate the
performance of methods. Samples of OULU-NPU video clips are shown in Figure 17.
4.1.2. Hyperparameter setting
    The proposed Multi-scale LTSS method is implemented in MATLAB. We used the
first 256 frames of the input video and fed them to the PhysNet. For the video, which
is shorter than 256 frames, we added several beginning frames to the end of the frame
sequences to supplement the video to 256 frames. We used two pairs of
hyperparameters for the Multi-scale LTSS. The settings of the length of sliding
windows w and the overlapping size of the sliding window o are [64, 16] and [128, 64]
respectively.
    The proposed Contextual Patch-Based CNN method is implemented in PyTorch
v1.0.1 [5] with the learning rate of e-4, and the training phase is 30 epochs. The batch
size of the Contextual patch-based CNN stream is 16. We train and test the model on
a Linux server with graphic card of NVIDIA K80, and a desktop PC with graphic card
of NVIDIA RTX 2080Ti.
4.1.3. Evaluation metrics
    In order to fairly compare the performance, we follow previous studies on each of
the databases and use the same evaluation metrics. The metrics are from the
standardized ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics [6]. For OULU-NPU database, we utilize 1)
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER), which evaluates the highest
error rate from all presentation attack instruments (PAI), for example, print or display,
2) Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER), which calculates the
error rate of real accesses, and 3) ACER, the average of APCER and BPCER:
=
∑ (1− )
, (15)
=
∑
, (16)
=
+
2 ,
(17)
where,  is the total number of attack presentations for the given PAI,  is the
number of bona fide presentations.  is set as 1 when the ith presentation is
classified as an attack presentation, and set  as 0 if classified as bona fide
presentation.
     For evaluations on 3DMAD and HKBU-Mars V1, we adopt HTER (Half total error
rate) and EER (equal error rates) metrics. TPR and EER are adopted for evaluations
on MSU-MFSD and CASIA-FASD databases. HTER is the mean of False Negative
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Rate (FNR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). FNR and FPR are commonly used in
presentation attack detection (PAD).
=
∑ (1− )
, (18)
=
∑ (1− )
, (19)
=
∑
, (20)
=
( ∗) + ( ∗)
2 ,
(21)
where,  is the total number of attack presentations for given presentations, and
is the number of genuine presentations. Same as the APCER and BPCER,  sets as
1 when the ith presentation is classified as an attack presentation and set  as 0 if
classified as genuine presentation. The threshold ∗  corresponds to the EER when
testing on the development set.
4.2. Experimental results
4.2.1. Intra Testing
We perform intra testing on 3DMAD, HKBU-Mars V1, MSU-MFSD, CASIA-
FASD, and OULU-NPU databases. For all the tests, we use 16 patch-based CP-CNN
as we found in our prior tests that 16 patches gave the best performance than other
partition patches. For the validation protocols, we use different testing protocols for
each database as described in below:
Testing protocol of 3DMAD: We follow the leave-one-subject-out cross-validation
(LOOCV) protocol which used in the original paper [1]. For all 17 subjects, we use
eight subjects’ videos as the development set, another eight subject’s videos as the
training set, and rest one subject’s videos as the testing set, and rotate for 17 times so
that each of all subjects’ videos were tested once.
Testing protocol of HKBU-Mars V1: We follow the same testing protocol as S. Liu
et al. [63] which is leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV). For all eight subjects,
we randomly chose three subjects’ videos for training, another three subjects’ videos
for developing, and the rest one subject’s videos for testing, and rotated for eight times.
Testing protocol of MSU-MFSD: When experimenting on the MSU-MFSD database,
we follow the protocol proposed in the original paper [2], e.g., 15 subjects’ videos
were used for training and the rest 20 subjects’ videos for testing.
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Testing protocol of CASIA-FASD: There were three testing protocols in the original
paper [3]. We utilize the overall protocol which used 20 subjects’ videos for training
and 30 subjects’ videos for testing.
Testing protocol of OULU-NPU: OULU-NPU has four different testing protocols,
and we tested with all four protocols and reported the results. Protocol 1 is designed
for testing the performance under different illumination conditions, for example,
videos captured under high light condition and the low light condition. The detailed
data assignment is shown in Table 1. Protocol 2 tests on different displays and printers,
to evaluate the presentation attack detection method when facing the presentation
attack instruments variation with two different printers and two different displays.
Detailed information is shown in Table 2. Protocol 3 in Table 3 tests on 6 different
kinds of phone cameras to evaluate the robustness of the face presentation attack
detection method. Protocol 4 is the most challenging one, which combines the key
points of all above three protocols and has the smallest number of training samples
among all testing protocols. The detailed information is shown in Table 4.
Table 1. The detailed information about OULU-NPU testing protocol 1.
Protocol Set No. Real
Videos
No. Attack
Videos
No. All Videos
1
Train 240 960 1200
Dev 180 720 900
Test 120 480 600
Table 2. The detailed information about OULU-NPU testing protocol 2.
Protocol Set No. Real
Videos
No. Attack
Videos
No. All Videos
2
Train 360 720 1080
Dev 270 540 810
Test 360 720 1080
Table 3. The detailed information about OULU-NPU testing protocol 3.
Protocol Set No. Real
Videos
No. Attack
Videos
No. All Videos
3
Train 300 1200 1500
Dev 225 300 1125
Test 60 240 300
Table 4. The detailed information about OULU-NPU testing protocol 4.
Protocol Set No. Real
Videos
No. Attack
Videos
No. All Videos
4
Train 200 400 600
Dev 150 300 450
Test 20 40 60
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For evaluations on 3DMAD and HKBU-Mars V1databases, we report achieved
EER and HTER in Table 5 and Table 6. The EER and TPR (when FNR = 0.1) achieved
on MSU-MFSD and CASIA-FASD are reported in Table 7 and Table 8 respectively.
For OULU-NPU, we report ACER, APCER, and BPCER of the four protocols in Table
9. We also compare our results with results from previous works.
Table 5. The intra-testing results on 3DMAD.
Method 3DMAD
EER HTER
Li et al.[34] 4.71 % 7.94 %
MS-LTSS 3.52 % 6.86 %
CP-CNN 0.00 % 0.00 %
MS-LTSS + CP-CNN 0.00 % 0.00 %
Intra-testing results on 3DMAD database: We compare with rPPG and texture-
based method and achieved the perfect result on 3DMAD. With only the CP-CNN
method, we could classify all the videos correctly. The proposed Multi-scale LTSS
method also outperformed previous results. Our CP-CNN model could extract the
more useful texture features of 3D masks, and the 16 patch-based methods solved the
problem of insufficient samples for deep learning.
Table 6. The intra-testing results on HKBU-Mars V1.
Method HKBU-Mars V1
EER HTER
MS-LBP [19] 23.0% 22.6%
Liu et al. [63] 14.7 % 16.2 %
MS -LTSS 0.95 % 3.11 %
CP-CNN 0.00 % 0.00 %
MS -LTSS + CP-CNN 0.00 % 0.00 %
Intra-testing results on HKBU-Mars V1 database: We compare the proposed MS-
LTSS and CP-CNN methods with two previous results, and the results showed the
superior performance of our methods on HKBU-Mars V1. With only the CP-CNN
method we could achieve perfect classification with zero error. The proposed Multi-
scale LTSS method made a few errors but still outperformed the baseline results with
a significant range. The HKBU-Mars V1 data contains both low quality and high-
quality 3D mask attacks which makes it more challenging than 3DMAD data. Our
results indicate that the proposed methods (both CP-CNN and MS-LTSS) have good
generalization ability over mask types. We used LOOCV protocol, which means that
even if an attacker uses a high-quality mask which is not seen in the training, our
proposed methods are still able to reliably detect the attack.
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Table 7. The intra-testing results on MSU-MFSD.
Method MSU-MFSD
EER TPR (FNR=0.1)
LBP Baseline 14.7 % 69.9 %
DoG-LBP Baseline 23.1 % 62.8 %
IDA [2] 8.6 % 92.8 %
MS-LTSS 3.4 % 96.5 %
CP-CNN 1.1 % 99.1 %
MS-LTSS + CP-CNN 0.00 % 100.00 %
Intra-testing results on MSU-MFSD database: We compared with two baselines
and a texture-based method, and with only MS-LTSS or CP-CNN we are able to
achieve better performance than previous results, and when these two are fused, we
achieved the perfect result with zero error. The MSU-MFSD contains video replay
attack and print attack which evaluates the robustness of method over different kinds
of attacks. The result indicates that our proposed method has good generalization
ability over different kinds of attacks.
Table 8. The intra-testing results on CASIA-FASD.
Method CASIA-FASD
EER TPR (FNR=0.1)
LBP+LDA [36] 21.0 % 75.7 %
IDA [2] 12.9 % 86.7 %
CDD [39] 11.8 % 88.8 %
Dynamic [67] 10.0 % 89.1 %
Patch-based CNN [13] 4.44% -
MS-LTSS 8.3 % 92.6 %
CP-CNN 3.2 % 96.6 %
MS -LTSS + CP-CNN 1.8 % 98.7 %
SPMT + SSD [68] 0.04 % 100.0 %
Intra-testing results on CASIA-FASD database: We compared with five state-of-
the-art methods with our proposed MS-LTSS and CP-CNN methods. Although we
didn’t achieve state-of-the-art performance, the performance is very close to it. Our
proposed CP-CNN achieved better performance compared with the prior patch-based
CNN. The CASIA-FASD data contains three kinds of quality of video replay attacks
and print attacks, which make it more challenging than MSU-MFSD data. Our results
indicate that our proposed methods are robust when facing different quality of video
replay attacks and print attacks.
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Table 9. The intra-testing results on OULU-NPU.
Prot. Method OULU-NPU
APCER (%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
    1
MS-LTSS 3.0 18.6 10.8
CPqD 2.9 10.8 6.9
GRADIANT 1.3 12.5 6.9
CP-CNN 2.1 8.3 5.2
MS -LTSS + CP-CNN 1.2 7.6 4.4
FAS-BAS [14] 1.6 1.6 1.6
Wang et al. [30] 2.5 0.0 1.3
2
MixedFASNet 9.7 2.5 6.1
FAS-BAS 2.7 2.7 2.7
GRADIANT 3.1 1.9 2.5
Wang et al. 1.7 2.0 1.9
MS-LTSS 1.8 15.3 9.5
CP-CNN 6.5 2.2 4.3
MS -LTSS + CP-CNN 4.7 2.5 3.6
3
MixedFASNet 5.3 ± 6.7 7.8 ± 5.5 6.5 ± 4.6
Wang et al. 5.9 ± 1.0 5.9 ± 1.0 5.9 ± 1.0
GRADIANT 2.6 ± 3.9 5.0 ± 5.3 3.8 ± 2.4
MS-LTSS 5.9 16.5 11.2
CP-CNN 2.5 ± 1.7 5.0 ± 3.3 3.7 ± 2.5
MS -LTSS + CP-CNN 1.9 ± 1.0 4.4 ± 2.6 3.1 ± 1.8
FAS-BAS 2.7 ± 1.3 3.1 ± 1.7 2.9 ± 1.5
4
Massy HNU 35.8±35.3 8.3±4.1 22.1±17.6
GRADIANT 5.0±4.5 15.0±7.1 10.0±5.0
FAS-BAS 9.3±5.6 10.4±6.0 9.5±6.0
Wang et al. 14.0±3.4 4.1±3.4 9.2±3.4
MS-LTSS 19.8±10.5 24.6±17.8 21.6±6.8
CP-CNN 18.7±16.2 23.5±23.5 20.5±12.5
MS -LTSS + CP-CNN 16.3±11.2 18.1±17.5 15.1±7.5
Intra-testing results on OULU-NPU database: We reported the results of four
protocols of OULU-NPU and compared with several state-of-the-art methods. The
OULU-NPU data recorded under four evaluation method is more challenging than all
previous data. In Protocol one, we achieved the best result of APCER, which indicates
that the proposed method has good generalization ability over different illumination
conditions. And in protocol 2 and protocol 3, our fused MS-LTSS and CP-CNN
method performed well and is very close to the state-of-the-art result, which
demonstrate that our method is robust over various displays and cameras. However,
protocol 4 is the most challenging one which contains all the evaluation key points,
and with much less training videos than those of the three previous protocols, our
methods did not work well probably because of insufficient training data.
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4.2.2. Cross Testing
In order to illustrate the generalization of the proposed method on mask attack, we
reported the results of cross-testing between 3DMAD and HKBU-Mars V1 databases
by following the baseline cross-testing protocol.
Cross-testing protocol of 3DMAD to HKBU-Mars V1. We randomly chose 8
subjects from 3DMAD database for training, and test on the whole HKBU-Mars V1
database.
Cross-testing protocol of HKBU-Mars V1 to 3DMAD. We randomly chose 5
subjects from HKBU-Mars V1 database for training, and test on the whole 3DMAD
database.
We report the HTER and EER of the cross-testing results and compare with the MS-
LBP baseline and S. Liu et al. [63] algorithms. The results are shown in Table 10.
Table 10. The cross-testing results between 3DMAD and HKBU-Mars V1.
Method 3DMAD to HKBU-Mars
V1
HKBU-Mars V1 to
3DMAD
EER HTER EER HTER
MS-LBP [19] 49.2 % 46.5 % 51.6 % 64.2 %
S. Liu et al. [63] 12.3 % 11.9 % 17.7 % 17.4 %
MS -LTSS + CP-CNN 0.7 % 1.2 % 1.6 % 2.1 %
It can be seen that our method (fused) overperformed the previous methods by a large
margin, which demonstrated the robustness of our method. In both cross-tests, our
method was able to achieve EER of less than 2%, which strongly supported that our
proposed method has a superior adaptability when facing novel mask attacks. Training
on 3DMAD performed slightly better than training on HKBU-Mars V1. This may be
caused by the camera quality of these two databases. The HKBU-Mars V1 videos are
of higher resolution which contain more detailed texture features than 3DMAD.
4.2.3. Ablation Study
The performance with different colour channels for estimating pulse signals. The
input videos can be divided into R, G, B channels, so we evaluate the PhysNet trained
with each of the three channels separately (as PhysNet R, PhysNet G and PhysNet B),
and then of all three channels (as PhysNet RGB) together. We feed the single-color-
channel video sequences and the original video sequences into the PhysNet to estimate
four sets of pulse signals, and evaluate them on OULU-NPU data with protocol 1. As
reported in prior works, the blue channel contains the noisiest signal, and the green
channel performs the best. Our results are consistent with prior findings. As shown in
Table 11, PhysNet G performed better than the other three conditions.
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Table 11. The results of utilizing different channels of estimated pulse signals for
extracting MT-LTSS features.
Method OULU-NPU P1
APCER (%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
PhysNet RGB 40.0 14.1 27.1
PhysNet R 12.3 10.3 17.5
PhysNet B 50.0 15.5 32.7
PhysNet G 3.0 18.6 10.8
The performance with different patches. We compare four architectures with
different patches to illustrate the advantages of the proposed patch-based CNN. We
train these four models on OULU-NPU based on Protocol 1, and the result of each
model is shown in Table 12. The first model without patches (Global) shows poor
performance due to lack of local features. In comparison, by using the local features
together with the global features, we achieve better performance in the second model
(Global+4P). Moreover, with an increased number of patches, the 16 patches model
(Global+16P) achieves even better results. Hence, we can see the advantage of
combining global and local features using patch-based CNN. In the current setting
Global + 16P achieved the best results but it doesn’t mean that more patches will
always lead to better results, we expect the performance will drop if the patches
number is too large although not tested here.
Table 12. The results of CP-CNN with different number of patches, on OULU-NPU
Protocol 1.
Method OULU-NPU P1
APCER (%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
Global 8.50 13.67 11.08
Global + 4P 5.75 12.63 7.69
Global + 9P 3.19 10.35 6.77
Global + 16P 2.1 8.3 5.2
The effectiveness of Multi-scale LTSS. In order to show the advantage of Multi-scale
LTSS for extracting the rPPG features, we test two different scales of LTSS ([64, 16]
and [128, 64]) and compare them with the combined MS-LTSS (([64, 16] + [128, 64]))
on OULU-NPU based on Protocol 1, and the results are shown in Table 13. It can be
seen that the combined MS-LTSS achieved significantly better performance that the
other two. We choose the combination of ([64, 16] + [128, 64]), where the first set of
parameters designed to extract the local rPPG feature with small window size and
overlapping. Furthermore, the second set of parameters is utilized for extracting the
global rPPG feature with larger window size and overlapping.
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Table 13. The results of different settings of LTSS and Multi-scale LTSS on OULU-
NUP Protocol 1.
Method OULU-NPU P1
APCER (%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
[64, 16] 7.2 17.4 12.3
[128, 64] 5.0 18.2 11.6
[64, 16] + [128, 64] 1.8 15.3 9.5
The effect of sequence length. In Table 14, we report results of different sequence
lengths for the proposed method (MS-LTSS + CP-CNN) on OULU-NPU based on
Protocol 1. Results show that by increasing the length of input sequences, we can
reduce the APCER and ACER. A possible reason could be that with longer sequences
we can achieve more accurate estimated rPPG signals. For extracting Multi-scale
LTSS features, longer signals contain more information, so the extracted MS-LTSS
features are more helpful for discriminating the input video as live vs. spoof. Another
possible reason is that longer videos provide more samples for the proposed CP-CNN
model.
Table 14. The results of MS-LTSS + CP-CNN model with different length of
sequences on OULU-NUP Protocol 1.
Method OULU P1
APCER (%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
64 Frames 13.1 18.1 15.6
128 Frames 12.5 15.3 13.4
256 Frames 3.7 15.3 9.5
4.2.4. Visualization and Error Analysis
We investigate some sample rPPG signals reconstructed by the proposed MS-LTSS
model in order to examine the method in more details. Figure 18 shows some examples
of successful and failed samples of rPPG signals and their power spectral density
(PSD) curves. It can be seen from the succeeded samples that, typical live faces have
periodical rPPGs and their PSD curves with a dominant peak, while typical spoofs
have noisy pattern rPPGs and their PSD curves with multiple random peaks at a much
lower amplitude. On the other side for the failure cases, some live faces and spoofs
have similar noisy pattern of rPPGs and PSD curves for some reasons (e.g., motions),
which make them difficult to be discriminated.
We also conduct statistical analysis on failed samples (53 samples, ACET=4.4%)
on the OULU-NPU protocol 1 on which our proposed model did not perform so well.
For each sample, we check the output scores of the Multi-scale LTSS and the
Contextual patch-based CNN independently. There are , , and  samples failed
from the MS-LTSS feature, the CP-CNN feature and the overlap of both features. One
possible reason of the failure is that the sampling rate of the original video is less than
30 fps or videos are shorter than 10 seconds so that the inputs are shorter than 256
frames, which caused that the estimated pulse signals are not completed. The length of
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inputs influences the accuracy of the estimated pulse signals and thus the Multi-scale
LTSS features. Hence, future research will focus on working with shorter samples.
Figure 18. (a) 8 successful face examples, their estimated rPPG signals, and PSD
figures. The left-side four are live and the right-side four are spoofs. (b) 4 failed
examples. The left-side two are live and the right-side two are spoofs.
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5. CONCLUSION
Nowadays, biometric-based security systems are threatened by various kinds of
presentation attacks. Although the face presentation attack detection methods are
becoming more and more robust and efficient. New face presentation attack
instruments are also developing at the same time. For example, the camera sensor and
the display resolution are increasing rapidly, so that the video replay attacks and print
attacks are more difficult to be discriminated. With the development of 3D print
technology, high-quality 3D masks are becoming more and more realistic with much
detailed textures. Hence, the traditional face liveness detection methods are vulnerable
with these situations. More innovation methods are still required to explore in this
research area.
At the beginning of this work, we reviewed previous face liveness detection methods
in recent years, from traditional methods to deep learning methods. rPPG based face
liveness detection methods as a branch of the face liveness detection research
orientation showed its unique advantages when facing print attacks and mask attacks.
We also reviewed benchmark rPPG extraction methods of prior works. Then we
proposed to use an advanced rPPG signal extraction method PhysNet to estimate rPPG
signals from videos, and then utilize rPPG based Multi-scale LTSS features for the
face anti-spoofing task.
During the study and the analysis of prior works of face liveness detection methods,
we found that one single method could not achieve excellent performance for all kinds
of spoofing, and they are also easily affected by different situations. So, most of the
recent research works are all based fusing two or more methods, for example,
combining temporal and spatial information, or patched and depth information. Hence,
we propose to combine two deep learning models, one based on rPPG features and the
other based on patch based texture features, to improve the performance of face
liveness detection.
For the study of deep learning based face liveness detection methods, we reviewed
the structures of the convolutional neural networks reported in prior works. In order to
combine the advantages of different CNN structures, we designed the Contextual
Patch-based CNN which combines global-local and multi-level deep texture features
simultaneously. This architecture of CNN has not been implemented in previous
studies yet.
As reported in prior works, the rPPG features are powerful for discriminating print
attacks and mask attacks, while texture features are effective for detecting replay
attacks. We evaluated these two approaches separately until we obtained well results
on each model. Then we fused these two models as our final model. Our proposed
method fusing MS-LTSS and CP-CNN models has shown robust performance on five
databases including various evaluations of the proposed method. According to the
analysis of results, 1) the rPPG based MS-LTSS model is extremely effective for mask
and print attack detection, 2) the Contextual Patch-based CNN achieved great
performance among all kinds of attacks, and 3) the fused model further improved
accuracy.
This is the most recent research which covers all kinds of attacks and evaluated on
most popular benchmark databases, and the results may inspire new research key
points to future studies in face anti-spoofing area. This work also gives a clear
conclusion of different methods for face anti-spoofing and did a lot of experiments on
different databases to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
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method. In the future, we will continue focusing on exploring the hidden information
of the rPPG signals which can be used for face liveness detection, and to improve the
structure of our CP-CNN to achieve more robust results when dealing with complex
conditions, for example, OULU-NPU protocol 4. We also plan to experiment on the
latest face anti-spoofing database SiW and conduct cross-testing between CASIA and
Replay Attacks by following the latest research orientation.
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